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1 Introduction
Financial liberalization in China has progressed steadily over the last decade. Capital
controls have become less e¤ective and can no longer provide long lasting protections
against capital inows (Ma andMcCauley, 2004; Prasad andWei, 2005). Moreover, reforms
in the banking sector highlight the transformation of the Chinese economy from a centrally
planned economy to a market-based one (Mo, 1999; Woo, 2002; Barnett, 2004). Greater
decision-making autonomy have been granted to the banking sector, and uctuations in
bank lending now have major implications for the macroeconomic situation (Hu, 2003) even
if the e¢ ciency of the banking sector remains low (Allen et al., 2005; Yao et al., 2007). As a
result, the magnitude and the nature of capital inows in China has changed greatly. Non-
foreign direct investment capital inows can henceforth fuel the Chinese nancial system
and provide excess liquidity to the banking sector. This led to a classic conict between
internal and external balances under a xed exchange rate system.
Over the last decade, China recorded strong current account surpluses and strong net
foreign direct investment (FDI) inows. Prasad and Wei (2005) show also that non-FDI
capital inows in China were particularly strong in 2003 and 2004. They were even stronger
than current account surpluses or net FDI inows. These non-FDI capital inows are fre-
quently called hot money inows. They were mainly driven by the interest rate di¤erential
between China and the United States (US), coupled with expectations of a renminbi (RMB)
revaluation. Current account surpluses and FDI inows are rather driven by fundamentals.
Changes in international reserves of the Peoples Bank of China (PBC) are determined
by current account balances and nancial account balances. Hot money inows in 2003
and 2004 have led therefore to a rapid accumulation of international reserves in China. The
central bank has been challenged to manage the expansion of the monetary base and more
1
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generally the expansion of monetary conditions1. Excess liquidity may have been provided
to the banking sector, promoting inationary pressures and an excessive credit expansion.
In this paper, we investigate wether the rapid build-up in international reserves in 2003
and 2004 was a source of monetary instability. Domestic credit and international reserves
are the two counterparts of money supply. The monetary stability that we consider is
therefore related to the relationship between international reserves and domestic credit.
When the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to keep the exchange rate
stable (following hot money inows, for example), net foreign assets increase in its balance
sheet, leading (all else being equal) to an expansion in the monetary base. This injection
of liquidity could positively a¤ect the growth of monetary aggregates, domestic credit
and output. The central bank could lose the control of money supply and more precisely
the control of domestic credit. As a result, monetary stability implies that international
reserves and domestic credit should be (all else being equal) negatively related so that if
one counterpart of money supply increases, the other decreases, suggesting that the overall
money supply is stable.
First, we examine with a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) on monthly data
from January 1997 to March 2006 the relationship between real international reserves and
real domestic credit. Empirical results show that this relationship was negative, which
suggests that the central bank succeeded in slowing down real domestic credit when real
international reserves increased. Second, we explain how the PBC proceeded to manage
the upsurge in international reserves and to keep domestic credit under control. The PBC
implemented sterilization measures in the narrow sense (with open market operations) as
well as in the broader sense (with a reserve requirement ratio and window guidance). We
1The monetary base equals the sum of net domestic assets plus net foreign assets (i.e. international
reserves).
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examine with direct and indirect causality tests how broad money and domestic credit had
been a¤ected by these sterilization measures. Empirical results show that open market
operations and reserve requirements did not drain all the liquidity. The upsurge in inter-
national reserves has led to excess liquidity. Nevertheless, we nd that the PBC succeeded
in shaping domestic credit using open market operations and window guidance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briey reviews causes
and implications of the upsurge in international reserves. Section III presents the empirical
assessment of monetary stability. Section IV investigates the management of net foreign
assets. Section V concludes.
2 Causes and implications of the upsurge in interna-
tional reserves
2.1 Hot money inows in China
The RMB has been convertible for current account transactions since 1996, but nancial
account transactions are still under control (Xiaopu, 2003; Yongding, 2004): portfolio
investments are constrained, foreign direct investments are oriented and main short term
capital inows are forbidden. Nevertheless, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is not
fully isolated from hot money inows. Capital controls are not applied to each category of
capital account transactions several are free or loosely managed (Xie, 2004)2.
The balance of payments roughly records the net amount of hot money inows (Tung
and Baker, 2004; Rzepkowski, 2004; Genberg et al., 2005; Prasad and Wei, 2005). In Table
2Prasad and Wei (2005) provide an extensive chronology of capital controls over the period 1980 -
January 2005.
3
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1, Hot Money is the sum of Portfolio Investment, Other Investment and Errors
and Omissions and corresponds therefore to non-FDI capital inows. First, signicant
portfolio investment inows are recorded in the nancial account. During 2003 and 2004,
net portfolio investment inows were respectively $11.43 and $19.69 billion. Second, Chi-
nese banks and depositors manage foreign assets. These transactions are recorded in the
sub-section Other Investmentin the nancial account but o¢ cial gures can be mislead-
ing. In December 2003, the PBC used $45 billion of its international reserves in order to
recapitalize two state commercial banks. This operation was recorded negatively in the sub-
section Other Investmentand the funds were allocated to a holding company owned by
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). As a result, o¢ cial gures suggest
that net other investment inows represented $-5.89 in 2003 but they actually represented
$39.11 billion in 2003. Net other investment inows also represented $37.91 billion in 2004.
Finally, some capital inows escape regulatory controls but are nevertheless recorded in
the statistical discrepancy of the balance of payments . Net errors and omissions increased
signicantly during 2003 and 2004, and represented respectively $18.42 and $27.05 billion3
which contrasts with illegal capital outows noticed during the 1990s (Gunter, 2004).
Hot money is mainly held by overseas Chinese (Chinese diaspora, mainly from Taiwan),
Chinese banks converting their foreign assets into RMB assets and depositors in the Chinese
banking system stopping the accumulation of foreign currency deposits (Ma and McCauley
2003, 2004; Rzepkowski, 2004). Hot money inows are estimated at $68.96 and $84.64
billion respectively in 2003 and 2004 (Table 1). They are stronger than current account
surpluses (respectively $45.87 and $68.66 billion) or net FDI inows (respectively $47.23
and $53.13 billion) during these two years. Hence, the rapid accumulation of international
3The evolution of the errors and omissions category may also in part reect an accounting issue related
to changes in the dollar value of foreign assets (Prasad and Wei, 2005).
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reserves during 2003 and 2004 o¤set mainly non-FDI capital inows rather than trade
surplus or net FDI inows.
The US interest rate could be an important factor in explaining these hot money inows.
The US interest rate decreased strongly in 2001 and remained low until 2005, whereas the
Chinese interest rate has been roughly stable over this period. In addition, exchange
rate expectations could constitute a second important factor in explaining hot money
inows. The PBC applied a xed exchange rate against the US dollar up to July 2005,
but speculation on RMB appreciation has been increasing in parallel to the general dollar
weakness and the trade imbalance between the US and China. The o¤shore interest rate
implied by the markets for non-deliverable forwards (NDF) in Asian currency underlines
this issue (Ma et al., 2004; Fung et al., 2004)4.
According to Goldstein and Lardy (2003) and Tung and Baker (2004), the PBC could
have implemented a 15% revaluation of the RMB but speculators can no longer expect
anymore such a large one-o¤ revaluation. The new exchange rate arrangement announced
in July 2005 makes clear that the PBC will move gradually toward more exchange rate
exibility. The PBC announced a 2.1% appreciation of the RMB against the dollar and a
move to a managed oat with reference to a basket of currencies. This new exchange rate
arrangement is heavily managed, the PBC allows a daily trading band of +/- 0.3% around
the exchange rate announced the day before. The remaining concerns are how China might
continue its move toward more exchange rate exibility and how China might undertake
the liberalization of its capital account (Eichengreen, 2004; Prasad et al., 2005; Obstfeld,
2006)
The US interest rate has been rising since mid-2004, while the Chinese interest rate
4The evolution of Chinese foreign currency deposits is particularly a¤ected by the interest rate di¤er-
ential and by exchange rate expectations (Ma and McCauley, 2002, 2003; Rzepkowski, 2004).
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has barely changed. Incentives for hot money inows have been therefore removed, and
indeed hot money inows evaporated in 2005. During the rst half of 2005, net hot money
inows are estimated at $8.56 (Table 1) and they became negative over the whole year
2005 ($-25.72)5.
2.2 International reserves and monetary stability
The following equations show how domestic credit might be a¤ected by an upsurge in
international reserves. The equilibrium condition in the money market is provided by
the LM curve. The money demand results from a transaction motive and a speculative
motive. The money supply is endogenous and its two counterparts are domestic credit and
international reserves. The equilibrium in the money market is dened by
IRt +DCt
Pt
= L(yt; it); (1)
where Pt is the domestic price level, IRt the international reserves, DCt the domestic
credit, yt the output, it the real interest rate on domestic bonds and L(:) the money
demand function with Ly(:) > 0 and Li(:) < 06.
Assuming simplied commercial bank balance sheets, where liabilities consist of de-
posits and where assets consist of required reserves, loans and bonds (Bernanke and Blinder,
1988; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990), the bank lending level is given by
DCt = [(1  )Dt](it; y^t); (2)
5We can notice in Table 1 that negative net hot money inows in 2005 are mainly explained by negative
net errors and omissions ($-16.77).
6Lj(:) is the partial derivative with respect to variable j.
6
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where Dt are the deposits,  the reserve requirement, y^t the output gap and 0  (:)  1
the fraction of bank assets loaned with i(:) < 0 and  y^(:) > 0. Risk-averse banks are less
willing to invest in loans when the rate of return on the less risky government bonds is
high. Furthermore, an economic slowdown deteriorates the overall quality of the borrowing
pool, which in turn reduces the willingness of commercial banks to supply credit.
Assuming a simplied central bank balance sheet where assets consist of net foreign
assets (NFAt) and net domestic assets (NDAt) and where the liability consists of the
monetary base, the money multiplier theory denes deposits as
Dt =
MBt
 + 
; (3)
where MBt = NFAt + NDAt is the monetary base and  the currency-demand deposit
ratio.
In a xed exchange rate system, changes in net foreign assets are determined by net
capital inows and the current account
NFAt = NFAt 1 + CAt +NK(qt   Et(qt+1) + it   it   t); (4)
where CAt is the current account balance, qt the domestic real exchange rate, Et(qt+1)  qt
the real expected depreciation of the domestic currency, it the US real interest rate on
bonds, t the risk premium and the extent of capital controls. NK(:) represents net capital
inows and depends positively on deviation from uncovered real interest rate parity (qt  
Et(qt+1) + it   it   t)7.
7We assume that purchasing power parity holds so that there is no Balassa Samuelson e¤ect.
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The bank lending level is therefore given by
DCt = [(1  )NFAt +NDAt
 + 
](it; y^t): (5)
Equations (1), (4) and (5) show how international reserves can a¤ect monetary con-
ditions. Equation (4) suggest that changes in the foreign interest rate and in exchange
rate expectations justify hot money inows and consequently the build-up of international
reserves. This accumulation of international reserves leads to an expansion in the mone-
tary base. This expansion is reected in deposits and can nally cause an excessive credit
expansion as suggested in equation (5). As a result, the two counterparts of money supply
could increase (equation (1)) and the central bank could lose the control of money sup-
ply. The central bank can implement sterilization operations to control domestic monetary
conditions8. First, net domestic assets can be adjusted downward with open market oper-
ations. Second, the reserve requirement can be increased to reduce the money multiplier.
Finally, the central bank can use administrative measures to curb domestic credit.
If we consider the situation of China in 2003 and 2004, hot money inows challenged
the PBC to limit the credit expansion. An excessive expansion in domestic credit could
lead to a new round of non-performing loans in the banking sector, undermining e¤orts
made by the PBC to strengthen the banking sector.
3 Empirical assessment of monetary stability
A VECM is estimated using monthly data from January 1997 to March 2006 to investigate
the stability of monetary conditions. We examine the relationship between real interna-
8See Brissimis et al. (2002) for a model analysing o¤setting capital ows and sterilization.
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tional reserves and real domestic credit. This relationship should be negative if the PBC
succeeded in managing the accumulation of international reserves and in keeping domestic
credit under control.
3.1 Data and VECM specication
Endogenous variables used in the rst specication of the VECM are real gross international
reserves less gold (IRt), real domestic credit (DCt), real industrial production (yt) and the
Chinese real interest rate (rt). Due to data availability of the Chinese interest rate, the
sample starts in January 1997 (we use the IFS, ARIC and EcoWin databases). The real
interest rate di¤erential between China and the US (rt   rt ) and gross domestic product
(GDP) at constant prices (ygdpt )
9 are also considered in di¤erent specications (see the
data appendix for the data sources). No other control variables are included in the model
specication in order to limit the scope of the model.
Four unit root tests are implemented: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Elliott-Rothenberg-
Stock (DF-GLS), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS).
We conclude that all the variables are non-stationary in level but stationary in rst-
di¤erence (these tests are available upon request). The VECM specication is therefore
Yt = 0 +
kX
i=1
i(Yt i) + (
0Yt 1 + 1) + "t; (6)
where Y 0t = [ DCt IRt yt rt ], 0 is a (4 1) constant vector,  is a (4 r) matrix
where r is the number of cointegration relation, 0 is a (r  4) matrix and the error vector
"t is such that E("t) = 0, E("t"0s) = 0 if t 6= s and E("t"0s) = 
 if t = s with det(
) 6= 0.
9The Chow and Lin (1971) method is used to obtain the GDP monthly estimate. This method allows
to obtain the best linear unbiased estimates of a monthly series by regression on related series. We use the
real industrial production index (IPI) as related series.
9
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The matrix  contains the cointegrating vectors and the matrix  contains the weights
attached to the cointegrating relations in the individual equations of the model. The
model is estimated with two lags (k = 2) in order to achieve normality (Jarque-Bera test)
and independence (LM test) of residuals. A lag exclusion (Wald) test is also implemented
and we nd that the third lag can be excluded (Table 2).
If there is only one cointegrating relation (r = 1), this relation can be written as
(
0
Yt 1 + 1) = dcDCt 1 + irIRt 1 + yyt 1 + rrt 1 + 1 = ect 1; (7)
where ect 1 is the error-correction term, i.e. the deviation from the long run equilibrium.
The Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method is used to estimate equation
(6). This method allows one to test for the number of cointegrating vectors using a trace
test. However, this test could lead to an over rejection of the no cointegration hypothesis
due to the nite sample bias and the possible cointegration rank inconstancy. Consequently,
backward and forward recursive trace tests are implemented to investigate the cointegrating
rank stability. Moreover, the trace test statistic is corrected for the nite sample bias as
suggested by Reinsel and Ahn (1992) and Reimers (1991)10. The trace test with the nite
sample bias correction supports the existence of one cointegrating vector at the 5% level
over the whole sample (Table 2, column 1). This result is conrmed by the maximum
eigenvalue test (Table 2, column 1). The backward recursive trace test
11 (Figure 1a)
supports the existence of one cointegrating vector at the 10% level but this test also shows
instabilities in the cointegrating vector in the baseline sample. The trace statistic decreases
10This correction does not consist in estimating new critical values but in multiplying the trace test
statistic by the scale factor (T   pk) =T , where T is the number of observations, p the number of endogenous
variables and k the number of lags .
11All the recursive procedures have to be cautiously considered. The range of the initial sub-samples is
small.
10
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when data before 2000 are considered in the sub-sample. The forward recursive trace test
(Figure 1b) conrms that there are instabilities in the cointegrating vector. Instabilities
appear in particular during the rst semester of 2004 when the trace statistic is temporarily
below the 10% level. These instabilities are more cautiously analysed below with the
estimation of the cointegrating vector since the stability of the trace statistic depends on
the stability of parameters  and .
3.2 Estimated cointegrating vectors
Table 2 displays several specications of the long run relationship (). The rst specica-
tion (1) represents the cointegrating relationship between real domestic credit (DCt), real
international reserves (IRt), real industrial production (yt) and the Chinese real interest
rate (rt) without any restrictions. This cointegrating relation is written as12
DCt =  0:622
(0:146)
IRt + 2:901
(0:386)
yt + 0:068
(0:014)
rt   13:695 + ect: (8)
The coe¢ cient of DCt is normalized to one to represent the cointegrating vector as a
reduced equation for real domestic credit. Real international reserves exhibit a negative
relationship with real domestic credit. The coe¢ cient associated with real international
reserves is high in absolute value (-0.622). Restrictions on this coe¢ cient can be tested
with a LR test (the null hypothesis is that restrictions are not rejected). We nd that this
coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from 0 and not signicantly di¤erent from -1 (Table 2) at
the 10% level. This suggests that the central bank would have managed the accumulation
12The cointegrating relation présented in equation (7) can be written as
dcDCt =  ir IRt   y yt   r rt   1 + ect:
11
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of international reserves very well to ensure the stability of domestic monetary conditions.
The PBC succeeded in adjusting real domestic credit downward when real international
reserves increased, which indicates that the accumulation of international reserves did not
lead to an excessive monetary expansion.
Real industrial production exhibits a positive relationship with real domestic credit.
The coe¢ cient associated with real industrial production index is high (2.901) in this rst
specication, and therefore suggests a strong pro-cyclical evolution of domestic credit. The
LR test supports at the 10% level that this coe¢ cient is di¤erent from 0 (Table 2).
The Chinese real interest rate exhibits a positive relationship with real domestic credit
which seems counter-intuitive and the LR test supports at the 10% level that this coe¢ cient
is di¤erent from 0. However, variable rt could reect the capital ight e¤ect. Indeed,
the interest rate liberalization has been gradual over the last decade (Mo, 1999; Garcia-
Herrero et al., 2006). This gradual switch from administrative measures to market-oriented
measures is not completed; moreover the functioning of the banking system is not very
sensitive yet to market practices. The nancial integration of China with the rest of the
world is also an ongoing process, but this might a¤ect domestic monetary conditions more.
Cheung et al. (2003) nd evidence for nancial integration between China and the US,
which conrms the erosion of capital controls. A rise in the domestic real interest rate
could therefore lead to capital inows which in turn could positively a¤ect the growth of
real domestic credit and real international reserves. In specication 2, the real interest
rate di¤erential between China and the US (rt  rt ) is used instead of Chinese real interest
rate (rt). This cointegrating vector is given by
DCt =  0:341
(0:064)
IRt + 1:970
(0:143)
yt + 0:032
(0:006)
(rt   rt )  9:022 + ect: (9)
12
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This specication is more appropriate for taking into account the capital ight e¤ect. The
coe¢ cient associated with real international reserves is lower in absolute value (-0.341)
in this specication. In addition the LR test shows that this coe¢ cient is signicantly
di¤erent from 0 and also signicantly di¤erent from -1 (Table 2). The accumulation of real
international reserves could have therefore led to partial downward adjustments in real
domestic credit.
In specications 3 and 4 (Table 2), a GDPmonthly estimate (obtained with the Chow
and Line (1971) method, see footnote 9) is used instead of the real industrial production
index. Specication 3 is estimated with the Chinese real interest rate (rt) and specication
4 is estimated with the real interest rate di¤erential between China and the US (rt  
rt ). The GDP monthly estimate does not seem to improve the measurement of economic
activity. The trace statistic over the whole sample does not reject the no cointegration
hypothesis at the 10% level (Table 2). Specications 3 and 4 are also estimated with three
lags because the lag exclusion test in Table 2 shows that the third lag is signicant at the
5% level (these estimations are available upon request). However, these specications with
three lags do not allow one to reject the no cointegration hypothesis at the 10% level. As a
result, the GDP monthly estimate does not provide an interesting alternative to represent
economic activity, and real industrial production is used in the next specications.
In specications 5 and 6 (Table 2), restrictions on the vector of adjustment coe¢ -
cients () are imposed to test the weak exogeneity of variables except real domestic credit.
Specication 5 is estimated with the Chinese real interest rate and is given by
DCt =  0:371
(0:089)
IRt + 2:104
(0:243)
yt + 0:028
(0:008)
rt   9:708 + ect: (10)
Specication 6 is estimated with the real interest rate di¤erential between China and the
13
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US and is given by
DCt =  0:286
(0:058)
IRt + 1:789
(0:132)
yt + 0:020
(0:006)
(rt   rt )  8:120 + ect: (11)
The joint weak exogeneity hypothesis in all individual equations except in the real domestic
credit equation is supported (LR test in Table 2) at the 1% level in specication 5 but
not at the 5% level. It is supported at the 10% level in specication 6. As a result, we can
conclude with specication 6 that real domestic credit is the only variable which responds
to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The adjustment coe¢ cient on the error-
correction term in the real domestic credit equation (dc in Table 2) is negative (-0.0742
in specication 5 and -0.1007 in specication 6) and signicant at the 5% level which
is consistent with equilibrium correction behavior. The cointegrating vector represents
therefore the long run determination of real domestic credit since other variables are weakly
exogenous. When the error-correction term is positive, due for example to a rise in real
international reserves, real domestic credit decreases to reach its equilibrium value. The
speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the rst order autoregressive coe¢ cient of the
error-correction term (Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994). We nd that 28% in specication
5 and 36% in specication 6 of the gap between real domestic credit and its equilibrium
level is eliminated every month. As a result, a given deviation in the cointegrating relation
is reduced to 90% of its original amount in 7.10 months in specication 5 and in 5.16
months in specication 6
13.
In specications 7 and 8, the homogeneity hypothesis between real international
reserves (IRt) and real domestic credit (DCt) is added to the weak exogeneity hypothesis
13If s is the speed of adjustment and if f and g are the initial and nal percentage deviation from
equilibrium respectively, the number of intervals from f to g is given by r = (ln(g)   ln(f))= ln(1   s)
(Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994).
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tested in specications 5 and 6. Specication 7 is estimated with the Chinese real
interest rate and is given by
DCt =  IRt + 4:031
(0:388)
yt + 0:125
(0:032)
rt   19:319 + ect: (12)
Specication 8 is estimated with the real interest rate di¤erential between China and the
US and is given by
DCt =  IRt + 3:224
(0:489)
yt + 0:132
(0:032)
(rt   rt )  15:006 + ect: (13)
The LR test does not supports these specications at the 1% level (Table 2) and we cannot
therefore accept the homogeneity restriction between real international reserves and real
domestic credit. As a result, the PBC succeeded in slowing down real domestic credit when
real international reserves increased but the homogeneity tests in specications 7 and 8
show that it was insu¢ cient to fully o¤set the accumulation of international reserves. This
led to loose monetary conditions in China, even if the PBC succeeded in keeping real
domestic credit under control.
Figure 3 displays the error-correction term corresponding to specication 6. The error-
correction term is scaled so that the deviations from the long run equilibrium level average
zero over the sample period14. It is clear from Figure 3 that the error-correction term is a
stationary process. Deviations from the horizontal axis might be interpreted as deviations
from the long run equilibrium. When the error correction term is above the horizontal
axis, real domestic credit is above its long run equilibrium level implied by the model. In
particular, the error correction term is above the horizontal axis in 2003 and 2004 when
14In specication 6, the error-correction term (ect) is dened as ect = DCt + 0:299IRt   1:831yt  
0:021(rt   rt ) + 8:324 where the constant term 8.324 is computed so that the average of ect is zero.
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strong hot money inows led to a rapid accumulation of international reserves. Therefore,
real domestic credit decreased gradually to reach its equilibrium value.
Specication 6 is recursively estimated in order to investigate its constancy. Figures
4a-d display recursive estimations of cointegrating vector 6 and adjustment coe¢ cient dc.
The value of these coe¢ cients increases or decreases over time, which explains instabilities
in the cointegrating relation exhibited by the recursive trace tests. The coe¢ cients of the
real industrial production (Figure 4a) and of the interest rate di¤erential (Figure 4b) are
constitently signicant and increase gradually over the sample period, respectively from
1.50 to 2.00 and from 0.01 to 0.02. The coe¢ cient of the real international reserves (Figure
4c) also increases gradually (in absolute value) from -0.10 to -0.30 but the two times
standard error band is above the horizontal axis before 2004. Adjustment coe¢ cient dc
(Figure 4d) decreases gradually (in absolute value) from -0.16 to -0.10, which suggests that
the deviations from the long term equilibrium became more persistent. These recursive
estimations do not exhibit structural breaks in the cointegrating relation but rather the
convergence of the estimated coe¢ cients toward their long term value when the sample is
increases.
3.3 Impulse responses
Impulse responses are used to analyze the dynamic interactions between variables and more
precisely between real international reserves and real domestic credit. We use specica-
tion 6 to implement these impulse responses. First, we implement a system Sequential
Estimation of Regressors (SER) procedure in order to test restrictions for the short run
parameters15. This strategy allows one to t a subset model, removing insignicant coef-
15The system SER procedure checks the parameter with the smallest t-ratio in each step. The elimination
of this parameter is based on the AIC criteria.
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cients. Second, a Choleski decomposition is used to implement orthogonalized impulse
responses. The variables are ordered as: yt, DCt, (rt   rt ), IRt, so that real domestic
credit can respond contemporaneously to yt but needs a time lag to respond to (rt   rt )
and IRt. However, impulse responses do not depend much on the order of the variables
because the reduced-form residuals are not strongly correlated.
We compute Halls studentized condent intervals based on 1500 bootstrap replications
and 100 replications for estimating the variance in each of the outer replication rounds.
Standard and Hall condent intervals based on 1500 bootstrap replications give similar
results but they are not displayed on Figures 5a-d for clarity. We also use these three
methods to compute condent intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications. Similar
results are obtained, which conrms the robustness of the condent intervals displayed on
Figures 5a-d.
First, we consider a shock in real domestic credit (Figure 5a). Other variables do not re-
spond signicantly, and so this shock is transitory. The adjustment force (dc) pushes real
domestic credit back to its equilibrium level. The two times standard error band intersects
with the horizontal axis after 16 periods. Second, we consider a shock in real international
reserves (Figure 5b). Real domestic credit reacts negatively and signicantly to this shock,
but the two times standard error band intersects with the horizontal axis after 8 periods
(Figure 5c). This impulse response therefore supports the negative relationship between
real international reserves and real domestic credit estimated in the cointegrating vector.
The PBC adjusts real domestic credit downward when real international reserves increase
to stabilize domestic monetary conditions, but this adjustment has a limited scale. Real
industrial production also reacts signicantly to the shock in real international reserves
and exhibits a positive impulse response (Figure 5d). The positive shock in international
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reserves could correspond to current account surpluses, net FDI inows and/or hot money
inows. Current account surpluses and net FDI inows are particularly favourable for
output growth, while hot money inows can lead to an overheating situation. This might
explain the positive impulse response exhibited by real industrial production. After ap-
proximately 16 months, the series seems to reach equilibrium16.
We conclude that the PBC did not lose control of domestic monetary conditions during
the rapid accumulation of international reserves in 2003 and 2004. The estimated cointe-
grating relations and impulse responses show that the interaction between real domestic
credit and real international reserves was negative. This suggests that the PBC succeeded
in keeping domestic credit under control, even if downward adjustments in real domes-
tic credit o¤set partially and gradually increases in real international reserves. We can
now examine how the PBC proceeded to manage the rapid accumulation of international
reserves.
4 The management of net foreign assets
In a xed exchange rate system, hot money inows lead the central bank to accumulate
international reserves. As a result, net foreign assets (NFA) in the central bank balance
sheet expand. Open market operations, reserve requirements and window guidance are
the main instruments used by policymakers to manage the consequences of these capital
inows on the domestic monetary sector17.
16Shocks in real industrial production and in the real interest rate di¤erential are not displayed. They
lead to a positive and signicant response of real domestic credit. These impulse responses are available
upon request.
17Monetary authorities can also directly inuence demand and supply in the foreign exchange market
in order to manage hot money inows. Lu (2004) examines measures taken by Chinese authorities to
ease appreciation pressures on the RMB. Nevertheless, the liberalization of capital outows could be
counterproductive, since this could stimulate further inows (Prasad et al., 2005).
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4.1 The sterilization policy
The PBC used open market operations to sterilize hot money inows. Central bank bills
were issued while treasury bonds were managed to drive the money market interest rate
(Xie, 2004; Green, 2005). Central bank bills are recorded as liabilities in the central bank
balance sheet but they are frequently merged with net other assets (NOA) to simplify the
central bank balance sheet (Hu, 2003)18. We can therefore investigate to what extent the
PBC used these open market operations to manage the monetary base. Figure 6 shows
year-on-year changes in components of the central bank balance sheet. Since 2003, the
PBC has widely used central bank bills to slow down the expansion of the monetary base
but this only partially o¤sets the build-up of international reserves. From end-2000 to end-
2003, Higgins and Klitgaard (2004) estimate that roughly half of the NFA increase was
sterilized by open market operations. Figure 6 also shows that the PBC intensied open
market operations in 2004 and 2005 to o¤set the upsurge in net foreign assets resulting, in
particular, from hot money inows and from the strong current account surplus in 2005.
We can therefore compute an indicator of net foreign assets non sterilized by open
market operations (NFOAt = NFAt +NOAt). This indicator has a direct impact on the
monetary base but not necessarily on monetary aggregates and domestic credit. Indeed,
the PBC can use reserve requirements and window guidance to complete the sterilization
process in a broader sense. Between the second half of 2003 and April 2004, the PBC
raised the banksreserve requirements ratio from 6% to 7.5%. The PBC sought in this
way to reduce the money multiplier in order to drain liquidity. Furthermore, the PBC
18Central bank bills can therefore be recorded negatively as net other assets and the central bank balance
sheet is resumed by the relation:
NDAt +NFAt +NOAt =MBt;
where NDAt are net domestic assets, NFAt are net foreign assets, NOAt are net other assets and MBt
is reserve money.
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implemented window guidance to curb new lending (Hagiwara, 2004; Green, 2005). The
PBC directly intervened in the lending of specic banks to specic sectors. Since the four
biggest banks accounting for 69% of total bank deposits and 72% of total bank loans 
are state-owned banks, bank instructions have been e¢ cient (Hu, 2003).
4.2 Direct causality tests
The management of international reserves by the PBC is investigated with Granger causal-
ity tests on vector autoregressive (VAR) models. This specication without explicit the-
oretical ground is appropriate insofar as the PBC widely used, in a discretionary way, its
control over the banking sector. The state-owned banks were used as sterilization bond
buyers and also to implement the window guidance (Hu, 2003; Roubini and Setser, 2005a;
Koivu, 2005). Thus, even if the banking sector obtained greater decision-making auton-
omy in its relations with rms during the last decade, the central bank kept the ability to
directly intervene in the banking sector in order to ensure the stability of monetary condi-
tions. This approach with VAR models therefore allows one to investigate the e¢ ciency of
sterilization when various monetary measures at various times in various intensities have
been used (Takagi and Esaka, 2001).
We analyse with Granger causality tests wether net foreign assets non sterilized by open
market operations (NFOA) a¤ect the monetary sector. These tests allow one to investigate
wether reserve requirements and window guidance have been e¤ective in completing the
sterilization process. We use the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolato and Lutkepohl
(1996) procedure. This procedure does not require a cointegration analysis and allows one
to mix orders of integration processes. This procedure is implemented in two steps. First,
we determine the maximum order of integration (dmax) of the variables in the system and
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the lag length (k) of a VAR system in stationary form. Second, we estimate a VAR in level
with p = k + dmax lags. Granger causality tests consist in applying standard Wald tests
to the rst k VAR coe¢ cient matrix.
We consider several VAR systems. First, we consider two bivariate systems including
NFOA and broad money (M2) or domestic credit. Second, we consider two multivariate
systems including real NFOA, real industrial production, the Chinese real interest rate
and real broad money or real domestic credit. Real industrial production and the Chinese
real interest rate are taken into account in these systems, which allows one to check the
robustness of the results obtained with bivariate systems. Finally, we consider a trivariate
system including NFOA, broad money and domestic credit in order to take into account
interactions between broad money and domestic credit.
We use the log transformation of index variable (January 1997=100) for all variables ex-
cept the Chinese real interest rate. In addition, VAR systems are estimated using monthly
data from January 1997 to March 2006. Four unit root tests are implemented: ADF, DF-
GLS, Phillips-Perron and KPSS. We conclude that all variables are non-stationary in levels
but stationary in rst-di¤erences (these tests are available upon request). The optimal lag
order of the VAR system in stationary form is chosen according to residual statistical prop-
erties (normality and independence). We conclude that each system needs three lags and
we take into account dummies19 to get normality in the residuals. As a result, we estimate
VAR systems in level with 4 lags and Granger causality is tested with restrictions placed
on lagged terms up to the third lag.
Figure 7a displays the recursive causality tests from NFOA to M2. We conclude at the
10% level that NFOAGranger caused M2 in the three di¤erent VAR systems. Open market
19April 2001 in the bivariate systems; June 2000 and April 2001 in the trivariate system.
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operations and rises in reserve requirements did not drain all the liquidity. Nevertheless,
the monetary expansion would have been much more considerable without open market
operations. These operations were provided banks with their main opportunity to get out
of excess liquidity (Roubini and Setser, 2005a). Figure 7b shows the recursive causality
tests from NFOA to domestic credit. We conclude at the 10% level that NFOA did not
Granger cause domestic credit in the three estimated VAR systems. Hence, open market
operations combined with window guidance enabled the curbing of credit growth and so
the PBC succeeded in keeping domestic credit under control.
4.3 Indirect causality tests
NFOA could all the same indirectly a¤ect domestic credit. Figure 7c displays the forward
recursive causality tests between broad money and domestic credit in the trivariate VAR
system. We conclude that there is a bidirectional causality between these two variables
even if the causality from domestic credit to broad money is not systematically conrmed
by the recursive procedure. As a consequence, NFOA does not help to predict domestic
credit one period ahead, but can still cause domestic credit several periods ahead with
indirect impacts via broad money.
Such indirect causality is investigated following Dufour et al. (2005). The trivariate
VAR model written at time t+ 1 is established by
Wt+1 = +
4X
l=1
lWt+1 l + et+1; (14)
where t = 0; :::; T   1; W 0t+1 = ( NFOAt+1 DCt+1 M2t+1 ),  is a 3x1 constant vectors
and the error vector et is such that E(et) = 0, E(ete0s) = 0 if t 6= s and E(ete0s) = 
 if t = s
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with det(
) 6= 0.
Equation (14) represents a VAR model at horizon one. This model can be expanded to
become an autoregressive process at horizon h. As suggesting by Dufour et al. (2005), we
consider the following unrestricted model
Wt+h = 
(h) +
4X
l&=1

(h)
l1
Wt+1 l1 +
h 1X
l2=0
'l2et+h l2; (15)
where h < T and '0 = I:
The Granger causality is tested at horizon h applying standard Wald tests to the rst 3
VAR coe¢ cient matrix (but not all lagged coe¢ cients). Besides, we use the heteroskedasticity-
autocorrelation consistent estimator developed by Newey and West (1987) to deal with the
MA(h-1) error process. The cost of this simple procedure is a loss of e¢ ciency, since the
unrestricted estimated model does not use all information. The highest horizon we need
to examine is h = 4(= 1x3 + 1) according to Dufour and Renault (1998): we have one
auxiliary variable (M2), the lag order of the VAR system in stationary form is three and
direct causality corresponds to h = 1.
Figure 7d displays recursive indirect causality tests from NFOA to domestic credit. We
conclude that NFOA did not indirectly Granger cause domestic credit at the 10% level.
The indirect causality test at horizon 3 is signicant at the 10% level at the beginning of
the recursive procedure, but this result is not robust after January 2004. Open market
operations and window guidance therefore allowed the PBC to manage direct and indirect
(via the loose liquidity conditions) e¤ects of net foreign assets on domestic credit.
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4.4 Costs of the sterilization policy
Several costs resulting from the PBC sterilization policy have been highlighted (Roubini
and Setser, 2005a-b; Goldstein and Lardy, 2005). First, the PBC used the state-owned
banks as sterilization bonds buyers. Although these bonds pay more than the 1% associ-
ated with excess reserves, banks face a protability issue. Sterilization bond yield is close
to the one on deposits, and excess reserves result from quantitative constraints on bank
lending. Consequently, the sterilization policy worsened the banking systems weaknesses.
Second, reserves management did not cause a protability issue for the PBC insofar as its
sterilization costs are largely o¤set by interest income on its reserves portfolio. Neverthe-
less, the PBC is threatened with an exchange rate risk and will face capital losses following
an exchange rate revaluation. Roubini and Setser (2005a) estimate that a 33% RMB ap-
preciation in 2004 would have represented a $150 billion loss which corresponds to 10%
of Chinas GDP. The PBC, that is taxpayers, is therefore exposed to the potential cost
of the current sterilization policy. Lastly, sterilization measures can promote additional
capital inows since they limit the narrow and broad money expansions and therefore keep
the level of domestic interest rates high. These additional capital inows only occur when
market participants consider that a higher risk premium on domestic assets does not o¤set
these higher interest rates (Takagi and Esaka, 2001).
These costs associated with the upsurge in net foreign assets justify Chinas move
toward greater exchange rate exibility in July 2005. This evolution is most apt to temper
the excess of the domestic nancial system, and will enhance the ability of the PBC to
tailor money and credit conditions to domestics needs (Eichengreen, 2004; Prasad et al.,
2005; Obstfeld, 2006).
24
Page 24 of 34
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5 Conclusion
Capital controls do not prevent hot money inows into China anymore. These controls
have become less e¤ective over time, and hot money inows were particularly strong in
2003 and 2004. As a result, the accumulation of international reserves in China increased
signicantly in 2003 and 2004. The Chinese authorities delayed for a long time the move
toward greater exchange rate exibility but they succeeded in managing the international
reserves build-up. The estimated VECM suggests that the PBC succeeded in keeping
domestic credit under control, even if downward adjustments in real domestic credit o¤set
partially and gradually the accumulation of real international reserves. Moreover, direct
and indirect causality tests show that the sterilization policy implemented by the PBC
allowed to manage the e¤ects of net foreign assets on domestic credit, even if the upsurge
in international reserves led to excess liquidity. However, the sterilization policy was costly
and it was not sustainable in the long run for the banking sector. Consequently, the PBC
decided to make a shift in its currency policy. It announced a 2.1% appreciation of the RMB
against the dollar and a move to a managed oat with reference to a basket of currencies
in July 2005. This evolution is most apt to temper the excesses of the domestic nancial
system and will enhance the ability of the PBC to tailor money and credit conditions to
domestics needs (Eichengreen, 2004).
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Data Appendix
Data are collected from three sources: the Asia Regional Information Center (ARIC)
database, the EcoWin database and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.
The series retrieved from the ARIC database are international reserves (total reserves
minus gold), the consumer price index (CPI), the industrial production index (IPI), the
three-month interbank real interest rate, the gross domestic product. The price series has
been seasonally adjusted by the Census X-12 routine (with multiplicative factors on the
levels).
The series retrieved from the EcoWin database is the Libor 3 month interest rate.
The series retrieved from IFS are the US consumer price index, domestic credit, broad
money (money plus quasi-money), net foreign assets and net other assets in the PBC
balance sheet. Series from monetary authorities, banking institutions and banking surveys
are interpolated from quarterly data before 1999.
We use the log transformation of index variable (January 1997=100) for all variables
except interest rates. The original data on domestic credit and international reserves are
modied. First, the $45 billions used to recapitalize two national banks are added to
international reserves in order to have a good specication of the accumulation of interna-
tional reserves. Second, data on domestic credit showed a strong break in January 2002
corresponding to a 13% monthly growth rate whereas it was around 1% during 2001. We
therefore consider a 1% monthly growth rate in January 2002. These two modications
allow one to obtain residual normality without the introduction of dummy variables.
Table 1: The balance of payment
2002 2003 2004 2005
First half End
Current Account 35.42 45.87 68.66 67.26 160.82
Financial Account 32.34 97.77 110.73 36.14 58.86
Direct Investment 46.79 47.23 53.13 22.48 67.82
Portfolio Investment -10.34 11.43 19.69 -0.97 -4.93
Other Investment -4.11 39.11 37.91 14.63 -4.03
Errors and Omissions 7.79 18.42 27.05 -5.11 -16.77
Hot Money -6.65 68.96 84.64 8.56 -25.72
Reserve Assets -75.51 -117.02 -206.36 -100.45 -207.07
Unit: billion of dollars. Source: EcoWin database.
Note 1: "Other investment" in 2003 includes the $45 billions used to recapitalize two state com-
mercial banks.
Note 2: "Hot Money" = "Portfolio Investment" + "Other Investment" + "Errors and Omissions"
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Table 2: Estimated cointegrating vectors
1 2 3 4
IRt -0:622
(0:146)
-0:341
(0:064)
-0:834
(0:260)
-0:306
(-0:089)
yt 2:901
(0:386)
1:970
(0:143)
- -
rt 0:068
(0:014)
- 0:139
(0:027)
-
(rt   rt ) - 0:032
(0:006)
- 0:050
(0:009)
ygdpt - - 5:332
(0:928)
2:688
(0:268)
1 -13.695 -9.022 -25.835 -12.591
Trace statistic
[p stat]
51:755
[0:020]
48:083
[0:047]
41:553
[0:176]
37:422
[0:327]
Max-Eigenvalue
statistic
[p stat]
29:313
[0:029]
25:286
[0:095]
27:012
[0:059]
23:458
[0:154]
dc -0:024
(0:009)
-0:063
(0:020)
-0:0142
(0:005)
-0:040
(0:015)
Speed of
adjustment
0.32 0.45 0.44 0.51
90% adjustment
(months)
5.97 3.85 3.97 3.23
2(1)
LR test
[p stat]
:
ir = 1
ir = 0
y = 0
r = 0
[0:512]
[0:010]
[0:027]
[0:000]
[0:014]
[0:006]
[0:003]
[0:005]
[0:864]
[0:022]
[0:048]
[0:000]
[0:060]
[0:030]
[0:013]
[0:000]
Jarque-Bera test
[p stat]
2(8)
4:858
[0:773]
2(8)
6:234
[0:621]
2(8)
12:400
[0:134]
2(8)
13:630
[0:091]
Lag 3 exclusion test
[p stat]
2(16)
5:941
[0:988]
2(16)
9:191
[0:905]
2(16)
29:341
[0:021]
2(16)
30:189
[0:017]
Note 1: According to equation (7), specication 1 is dened as :
DCt =  irIRt   yyt   rrt   1 + ect =  0:62IRt + 2:90yt + 0:07rt   13:69 + ect
Note 2: The speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the rst order autoregressive coe¢ cient
of the error-correction term (ect). The 90% adjustment is equal to ln(0.10)/ln(1-s) where s is the
speed of adjustment (Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994).
Note 3: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Estimated cointegrating vectors (continued)
5 6 7 8
IRt -0:371
(0:089)
-0:286
(0:058)
-1
(-)
-1
(-)
yt 2:104
(0:243)
1:789
(0:132)
4:031
(0:388)
3:224
(0:498)
rt 0:028
(0:008)
- 0:125
(0:032)
-
(rt   rt ) - 0:020
(0:006)
- 0:132
(0:059)
1 -9.708 -8.120 -19.319 -15.006
Trace statistic
[p stat]
51:755
[0:020]
48:083
[0:047]
51:755
[0:020]
48:083
[0:047]
Max-Eigenvalue
statistic
[p stat]
29:313
[0:029]
25:286
[0:095]
29:313
[0:029]
25:286
[0:095]
dc -0:075
(0:016)
-0:104
(0:023)
-0:018
(0:004)
-0:010
(0:003)
Speed of
adjustment
0.29 0.33 0.32 0.27
90% adjustment
(months)
6.72 5.75 5.97 7.31
LR test
[p stat]
2(3)
8:161
[0:042]
2(3)
5:809
[0:121]
2(4)
14:378
[0:006]
2(4)
16:725
[0:002]
Jarque-Bera test
[p stat]
2(8)
5:113
[0:745]
2(8)
5:481
[0:705]
2(8)
5:942
[0:653]
2(8)
5:309
[0:724]
Lag 3 exclusion test
[p stat]
2(16)
7:795
[0:954]
2(16)
10:793
[0:822]
2(16)
5:984
[0:988]
2(16)
8:749
[0:923]
Note 1: The speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the rst order autoregressive coe¢ cient
of the error-correction term (ect). The 90% adjustment is equal to ln(0.10)/ln(1-s) where s is the
speed of adjustment (Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994).
Note 2: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Backward and forward recursive trace tests
a- Backward recursice trace test b- Forward recursive trace test
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Note: The backward recursive trace test checks the cointegrating rank constancy in the baseline
sample. Figure 1a has therefore to be read from the right side to the left side.
Figure 3: Error-correction term (ect)
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Figure 4: Recursive estimation (6): DCt =  irIRt   yyt   (r r)(rt   rt )  1 + ect
a- Recursive estimation: y b- Recursive estimation: (r r)
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Note: The dotted lines represent the two times standard error bands.
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c- Recursive estimation: ir d- Adjustment coe¢ cient (dc)
-0,50
-0,25
0,00
0,25
0,50
20
02
:0
1
20
02
:0
7
20
03
:0
1
20
03
:0
7
20
04
:0
1
20
04
:0
7
20
05
:0
1
20
05
:0
7
20
06
:0
1 -0,30
-0,20
-0,10
0,00
20
02
:0
1
20
02
:0
7
20
03
:0
1
20
03
:0
7
20
04
:0
1
20
04
:0
7
20
05
:0
1
20
05
:0
7
20
06
:0
1
Figure 5: Impulse responses
a- Response of DCt to DCt b- Response of IRt to IRt
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Note: Condent intervals represent the 90% studentized Hall intervals based on 1500 bootstrap
replications and 100 replications for estimating the variance in each of the outer replication rounds.
These impulses responses are computed with JMulti 4.02 (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004)
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Figure 6: Year-on-year changes in the PBC balance sheet
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Note: MBt = NFAt + NDAt + NOAt. Changes in NDAt are quite small since 2001, so they
are not displayed. NOAt equals the di¤erence between other assets and other liabilities and can
therefore either be positive or negative. Source: IMF IFS database.
Figure 7: Forward recursive causality tests
a- Direct casality from NFOA to M2 b- Direct causality from NFOA to DC
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c- Direct causality between DC and M2 d- Indirect causality from NFOA to DC
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Note: H0: variable X does not Granger cause variable Y.
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